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To Flee or Not To Flee
The conflicting messages of Soviet wartime propaganda and the
Holocaust, 1941
Fuir ou ne pas fuir : l’Holocauste et les messages contradictoires de la
propagande soviétique pendant la guerre, 1941
Kiril Feferman
“Doublethink means the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs 
in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both
of them.” 
George Orwell, 1984
1 In the prewar Soviet Union, ordinary people became skeptical of official media outlets as
up‑to‑date purveyors of information.1 Rather, they were perceived as regime propaganda
tools for shaping public opinion.2 To keep current in this “fog of peace,” citizens turned
to informal channels such as word of mouth.3
2 With the Soviet‑German war in June 1941, Soviet media might have undertaken a new
role to inform the public  in a timely fashion about frontline developments.  But that
prospective mission was counterbalanced by censorship concerns lest military secrets be
leaked.4 Consequently, one could anticipate that there continued to exist a gap between
media serving as propaganda instruments and their role as information supplier.5 This
discrepancy  could  prove  detrimental  for  such a  vulnerable  group as  Jews  who were
specially targeted by the invaders and thus needed to know the proximity of German
forces. Perplexed and mistrustful of Soviet propaganda messages, some Jews decided to
stay under German rule. 
3 The article examines the behavior of one Soviet Jewish family, the Ginsburgs, in the city
of Rostov‑on‑Don6 (henceforth Rostov), from June 22 to December 31, 1941 as a case study
in the possible impact of Soviet media.  During this period, the family faced a crucial
decision: to flee or to stay. Official Soviet media, whether accessed directly or interpreted
by  third  parties  (relatives,  friends,  neighbors,  etc),  served  as  a  major  source  of
information for them. This study analyzes how Soviet media handled two issues of critical
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importance to all Jews: the course of the war, in particular, the possible German seizure of
Rostov, and the German mistreatment of Jews. Within this timespan—in November 1941—
the city was indeed seized by the Germans.7 How this official information along with
sporadic  rumors  framed  public  consciousness  is  analyzed  via  a  collection  of  letters
addressed by members of the Ginsburg family to their relatives in the Soviet hinterland,
along  with  media  sources  gleaned  primarily  from  the  newspaper  Molot  [Hammer]
published in Rostov by the district and city Bolshevik Party Committees, as well as the
city administration, and the central newspapers (Pravda and Izvestiia).8 
4 Originally from Odessa, the Ginsburg family moved to the city of Rostov before the First
World War. During the period under review, almost the entire family continued to live in
Rostov or fled it to neighboring areas. The only exception was Efim Ginsburg (1897‑1973),
to  whom almost  every  letter  in  this  collection  was  addressed.  In  July  1941,  he  was
evacuated from Moscow to Omsk and then, to Alma Ata. In 1941, the Rostov branch of the
Ginsburg family numbered ten people and was made up of three generations. The adults
occupied middle‑level positions in a local industry and service. The main correspondents
were the sisters Anna Greener and Liza Chazkewitz (both born in 1893), as well as their
niece, Tamara Meerovich (born in 1913). Only one family member, Vladimir Meerovich,
was a member of the Party. Almost the entire family perished during the second German
occupation  of  the  North  Caucasus  in  the  second  half  of  1942.  The  exceptions  were
Vladimir Meerovich, who enlisted in the army in April  1942 and was killed in action




5 As Soviet archives became more accessible after the dismantlement of the USSR, several
important studies appeared analyzing the functioning of Soviet propaganda in the years
leading up to the German invasion .9 However, there is as yet little research on the impact
of newspapers and other propaganda forms on the attitudes of Soviet people before the
Soviet‑German war.10
6 Confronted with the  German invasion on June 22,  1941,  Soviet  Jews had three basic
options at their disposal. Some were eager to fight against Germans, and in practice this
almost always meant joining the retreating Red Army. Many Jews could not make up their
minds what to do and decided not to decide anything.  Some of  them waited for the
Germans,  hoping  that  the  rumors  on  German  mistreatment  of  Jews  would  prove
groundless. Others anticipated that the storm would somehow pass over them, i. e. the
Red Army would repel  the  German attack.  Finally,  masses  of  Jews  opted to  flee  the
approaching German armies. 
7 The process of escape or evacuation for Soviet Jews, alongside other Soviet people, looked
as follows. Because, according to Soviet government directives, the evacuation of civilians
dovetailed with their significance to the country’s war effort and the survival  of  the
Soviet  regime,  a  priority  was  placed  on  (1)  safeguarding  the  lives  of  functionaries
affiliated with the regime and their families and (2) moving agricultural and industrial
facilities,  together  with  the  workers  employed  in  them.11 The  government  did  not
prioritize Jewish evacuation outside these categories, i. e. it did not order their removal,
nor did it inform Jews that they had been singled out by the Germans for particularly
cruel treatment. Yet Jews were often given a chance to escape in an organized manner.12
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To do so,  they had to obtain evacuation authorization, contingent on the issuance of
clearance by their employers. To leave one’s working place without a permit and to flee
on one’s own was considered a serious crime, especially given the conditions of war. The
government regulations held water as long as the Soviet system functioned properly, but
once the Germans approached, it began to crack and an uncontrollable flight of civilians
began. 
 
The North Caucasus and Rostov at war and the
Holocaust in 1941
8 The Caucasus possessed a unique strategic value in the Soviet‑German war. Nazi Germany
needed Caucasian oil to continue putting into motion its war machine.13 During the first
period of the Soviet‑German war (June 22 ‑ late July), the North Caucasus remained far
away from the main theaters of operation.14 The region even emerged as an important
evacuation destination in summer – autumn 1941.15 Except for conscription, Rostov was
largely spared from the horrors of the war. Thousands of people, including many Jews,
fled through the region, while some of them stayed there. 
9 The second period began with Hitler ordering Army Group Center to strike into Ukraine
before  resuming  the  drive  on  Moscow.16 Great  numbers  of  evacuees  and  refugees,
including thousands of Jews, flocked through the North Caucasus eastwards.17 This flight
affected  the  behavior  of  North  Caucasian  Jews,  including  those  living  in  the  Rostov
district.18 The evacuation of civilians from the Rostov region, intensified in September‑
October 1941, leading to the organized removal of 100,000‑150,000 civilians, alongside
50,000‑100,000 people who fled the region on their own. Among the organized evacuees,
there were 7,000‑10,000 Jews,19 and a similar number of Jews fled independently.20
10 German air‑strikes of Rostov commenced from early August. The German land armies
began  their  advance  towards  the  North  Caucasus  starting  from  the  beginning  of
September 1941. By late October, they occupied part of the Rostov district around the city
of Taganrog and two weeks later,  its entire Jewish population numbering some 1,800
people was shot by Sonderkommando 10a (part of the Einsatzgruppe D). 
11 The Wehrmacht entered Rostov on November 21, 1941. The German occupation of Rostov
lasted only one week and was badly documented. Nevertheless, it is evident that the city’s
Jews were immediately required to register and, according to some sources, to bear six‑
pointed stars. On November 22, the German authorities ordered the establishment of a
Jewish council. Failure to comply with these orders was made punishable by death.21 
12 However, it appears that these orders were largely ignored by Rostov Jews because they,
like the rest of the population, spent this week in shelters. The city was heavily shelled by
Soviet artillery poised very close to Rostov. For their part, the Germans refrained from
moving around the city and enforcing the order. The Germans murdered dozens or even
hundreds  of  captured Jewish Red Army soldiers  and local  civilians,  including  Jews,22
sometimes as retaliation for a murder of German military personnel in the city.23 The
Wehrmacht retreated from Rostov on November 28 as a result of the Red Army counter‑
offensive but remained in control of a part of the Rostov district near Taganrog. The front
line in this sector of the war stabilized until the summer of 1942.
13 The  German  policies  towards  Jews  during  the  week  of  the  occupation  conveyed  an
ambiguous message to local Jews. The Germans killed only a fraction of Rostov Jews, and
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their  intentions  remained  unknown  to  the  remaining  ones.  Furthermore,  German
administration in the occupied city conducted an ‘iron fist’  policy towards all  Rostov
inhabitants. As a result, after the first German occupation, many of Rostov’s Jew remained
confused about what to do. Some Jewish survivors fled eastwards. Others concluded that
the Germans would confine themselves to discrimination and hence, there was no need to
evacuate, suffer from privations along the road and risk losing property. Significant for
many Jews was the Red Army’s ability to quickly recapture Rostov, which testified, so
assumed many Jews, to its willingness and ability to hold on to the city at any cost. 
 
The first period (June 22 – July 31, 1941)
14 The war began on June 22 and on the same day, general conscription was proclaimed in
the North Caucasian military district.24 Three days later, the Rostov newspaper Molot
reported how smoothly the draft decree was carried out in the city.25 The frontline was
far away but four days after the outbreak of the war, on June 26, 1941, the Soviet military
command in Rostov issued its initial, small‑scale limitations on the free movement of the
urban population. These measures were made public when Molot published “Order No 3
of the Commander of Rostov‑on‑Don’s anti‑aircraft defenses on limiting the movement of
vehicles without special permits at night.”26 
15 On the next day, the Rostov newspaper published a small note on the last page: “For
violations of black‑out regulations, a person is sentenced to five years imprisonment by
the  decree  of  the  Military  tribunal  of  the  North  Caucasian  Military  District.”27 The
warning served to indicate that Soviet military command in Rostov seriously considered
the threat that the city might come under a German air attack. 
16 On June 25, the Soviet government issued a ban on keeping radio sets at home. This was
done in order to prevent Soviet citizens from listening to German propaganda broadcasts.
Although not  announced publicly,  the decree was immediately applied in the Rostov
district  and  individual  radio  sets  were  requisitioned.28 Radio  continued  to  supply
essentially the same information about the advance of German armies as newspapers. Yet
Holocaust‑related information was hardly made available to Caucasian Jews in 1941‑42 by
means of radio.29
17 In the first days of the war, one could witness a turnabout in the Soviet propaganda
approach towards presenting Nazi anti‑Jewish policies. It had been already noticeable in a
prewar Soviet feature film, Professor Mamlock (Lenfil´m), that featured Nazi persecution
of Jews in Germany. Released on November 7, 1938, Professor Mamlock was screened in
the first half of 1939 but suppressed following the Soviet‑German Non‑Aggression Pact in
August 1939.30 In Rostov,  Professor Mamlock was advertised in the press as an “anti‑
Fascist movie” and screened in the city’s most important theater only three days after the
outbreak of the war.31 
18 On June 26, Molot published a report on German persecution of Jews in the entire German
‑held part of Poland:
In the General‑Government, Jews and Poles receive lower rations than Germans. In
the areas annexed to the Reich, up to 1.5 million Jews and Poles were evicted from
their  homes  and  their  property  entirely  confiscated.  The  Jewish  population  is
actually placed beyond the law and driven into ghettos; in cities they are fenced off
by barbed wire. Jews above the age of ten are obligated to wear a large yellow or
green star. Jews are forbidden to use public tramways. Every Jew has to work two
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years without pay in a labor camp. In Dombrow, a synagogue full of praying Jews
was set ablaze.32
19 Such publications should be seen against the background of a mounting Soviet anti‑Nazi
propaganda attack. The article also served as the first important signal for the Soviet
Jewish  population  in  Rostov  warning  it  about  what  could  await  under  German rule,
including first references to physical annihilations.33
20 This relative abundance of reports on the fate of the Jews under German rule, on the one
hand, and silence on the Wehrmacht advance into the Soviet territory, on the other,
constitutes  the setting for  the appearance of  the first  letter  we have written by the
members of the Ginsburg family. On July 3, Liza Chazkewitz wrote to her brother, Efim
Ginsburg: 
Our only hope and desire is that the accursed enemy who shattered the peace of the
whole people of our Soviet Union (especially of the Jews) will be smashed as soon as
possible. We believe firmly that the enemy will be destroyed, and victory will be
ours.34
21 To be sure, Liza extensively employed Soviet propaganda clichés, like “shattered peace”
and “the enemy will be destroyed and the victory will be ours”. Generally speaking, her
letter looks like a typical Soviet newspaper clipping, which evidently points to her being
profoundly affected by Soviet propaganda, including print media. Yet at the same time,
her emphasis on Jews as being singled out in this war, glossed over in Soviet propaganda,
is curious. Liza provided no explanation for her remark, as it appeared to be evident to
both her and her addressee even in this very early stage of the war. 
22 This family correspondence was not a diary intended for a home use.35 As it was sent via
the post, it could be read by Soviet censors. Soviet censors intercepted the private letters
of Soviet citizens even before the war erupted, and there is little doubt that Soviet people
were  well  aware  of  this.  The  situation  changed,  however,  after  the  outbreak  of  the
hostilities when the Soviet government deemed it fit to publicly admit the existence of
censorship.36 
23 On July 23, Liza wrote another letter to her brother, Efim, who was evacuated in July 1941
from Moscow to the city of Omsk in Siberia: 
[…] We are all alive and in good health. It is still all quiet with us.
Our dear! Don’t regret that you got there. We assume that it will be better there, we
feel  confident  about  you  there  and  wouldn’t  mind  being  next  to  you.  But  it  is
difficult and even impossible. It is highly desirable that the confounded Fascism will
truly fail very soon so that we’ll again be close to each other37 
24 A change in Liza’s mood was discernible here. At this point, she was not against leaving
Rostov in principle, but could not do so for practical considerations. Her confidence in an
imminent Soviet victory and the ensuing defeat of Germans is not as strong as in her
previous  letter;  now it  is  “highly  desirable,”  while  the  entire  situation  in  Rostov  is
described as only “still quiet.”
25 These motifs were also implied in the letter written by Liza on July 27: “[…] We should
hope that the enemy will be entirely smashed soon.”38
 
The second period (August 1 – November 29, 1941)
26 Despite the German advance on all the fronts, Soviet media went out of their way to
create the impression that the situation remained under control. One example of this
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approach is an announcement in the Rostov newspaper, on August 1, informing readers
that a new academic year had begun at Rostov’s institutions of higher education.39 
27 On August 7, Liza sent a new letter to her brother Efim in Omsk echoing the quiet mood of
the Soviet press and seemingly unrelated stories about the bitter fate of foreign Jews: “I
hasten to report to you that we are all in good health; it is still all right here […] Mania is
also all right; the children are fine; everyone is working.”40
28 For the time being, everything seemed to be quiet. But apparently because of Liza’s fear of
Soviet censorship or in order not to sadden her brother, she said nothing about the first
German bombardments of Rostov, which began in early August. The word “still” is the
only sign that may indicate growing anxiety among the Rostov Ginsburgs.
29 Of special interest is the way the Rostov newspaper dealt with German bombardments of
the city.  On August 12,  it  reported that German airplanes had conducted air‑raids on
Moscow  causing  destruction  and  casualties.  Yet  nothing  was  said  about  the
bombardments of Rostov.41 The two only hints of them could be found in an article about
a large‑scale drill on extinguishing incendiary bombs conducted in Rostov42 that appeared
in the very same issue of the newspaper and in a small satirical article published on
August 26.  The  article  urged  the  population  not  to  exaggerate  the  dimensions  of
bombardments: “People are making a mountain out of a mole‑hill.”43 
30 More information on German policies towards Jews appeared in Molot on August 15:
In locality G., Hitler’s bandits placed forty Jews, men and women in a square and
shot all of them down. The hangmen locked ninety elderly persons and children in
a barn and set out to shoot them with an automatic rifle.44
31 This  was  the  first  time that  the  physical destruction of  Jews  in  the  occupied Soviet
territories was reported by the Rostov newspaper. 
32 At the very end of August, we see more cracks between the official Soviet propaganda line
and the way it was perceived by the Ginsburg family in another letter from Liza to Efim:
We are very anxious and concerned. Yesterday evening we sat in a shelter for three
hours, it was already the third time, how […] dreadful it is when an air‑raid alarm
begins. We don’t know what is going to happen to us. […] If we had had wings, we
should have flown to you because we think that it is quiet in your place […] That’s
all for the time being. It doesn’t look good, but let’s hope that it will be good, one
can’t lose hope.45
33 There is no reference in the letter to human losses or material damage, of which the
Ginsburgs,  as ordinary inhabitants of Rostov,  were likely unaware.  This could be still
explained  by  their  continuous  fear  of  the  Soviet  censorship.  Yet  something  new  is
happening. Fear of German bombardments fraught with mortal danger led the Rostov
Ginsburgs to partly depart from strictly keeping to the official Soviet line. Obviously they
reassess the situation as grave.
34 But we should ask ourselves the most important question for our story. How did the
family interpret these bombings? Did they realize that the Germans were now closer?46
The Ginsburgs’ initial reaction to the bombardments, as expressed in this letter, seems to
signal their having “frozen” or a lack of any decision on their part.
35 In addition to air‑raids, a new factor emerged in Rostov in the course of August 1941:
many old people and youngsters were sent to dig anti‑tank trenches.47 From this the
Ginsburgs could infer that the German land advance to Rostov was a possibility to be
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reckoned with. It is against this background that the following letter written by Liza on
September 7, 1941 should be read:
What really matters is that the barbarous enemy be smashed soon. It will be the
best thing for everyone!!! From September 1, it is quiet here, but it is not quiet at
heart; we are alarmed and live in a state of anxiety. Nonetheless, we don’t lose hope
and wait for good news [expecting] to see each other again […] Well, my dear, that’s
all for the time being. Let’s wait and hope and we’ll be spared. […] We […] wish you
all the best, hoping for a joyful meeting after the victory.48
36 It is not easy to establish whether when they wrote about the defeat of the Germans, the
Rostov branch of  the Ginsburg family was still  prone to Soviet propaganda messages
compounded with their fear of censorship and/or if they really believed in defeat. My
feeling is that since these strong phrases about defeat were put at the beginning and at
the end of the letter, apparently out of context with the rest of the text, they largely
served to placate Soviet censors.
37 The September 7 letter reflects growing anxiety and uncertainty to the extent that, for
the  first  time,  the  Ginsburgs  did  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  escape,  albeit  as  a
theoretical  option  for  the  time  being.  Still,  at  this  stage,  fear  of  a  long  journey  to
uncertainty  clearly  outweighed  their  fear  of  the  Germans,  and  they  were  evidently
reluctant to take practical steps in this direction. 
38 Ten days later, on September 17, Liza wrote a new letter to Efim: 
It is still all right here; let’s hope this will go on like that further […] Our mood is
somehow far from being all right (ne akhti). It is not quiet at heart. But let’s wait
and hope to receive only good news.49
39 Rostov’s  Ginsburgs feel  more and more anxious,  as  the situation in the Soviet  south
appeared to be worsening. Still, they did not know how close the Germans were and could
not assess the gravity of the problem. Official Soviet sources pointed to fighting far away
from Rostov: a newsreel (N° 91) released on September 18 and shown all over the Soviet
Union, including Rostov, described Soviet preparations to defend Odessa.50
40 However, as the Red Army failed to check the advance of the Wehrmacht towards the
Caucasus, even official Soviet propaganda had to address the aggravating situation at the
front, albeit in a veiled fashion. On September 26, 1941, the Rostov newspaper published
on its first page a large article “The German Fascists will not tread on the Don steppe!”
about a get‑together of former partisans and participants of the Civil War at Razdorskaia
stanitsa.51 This was the first signal in a local Rostov media source indicating the growing
danger of the German thrust on the city.
41 Growing anxiety was manifest in the sisters’ letter written the next day, October 3:
Right now, we are not considering relocating anywhere because, for the time being,
the  question  is  not  yet  so  acute  for  us.  Let’s  hope  that  we  won’t  need  to  go
anywhere. In any case, we don’t even think about going to you since it is so far. If
need be, we’d better go not too far. Don’t think about sending us money and selling
anything. It won’t help anything.52
42 Here we detect a noticeable change in the Ginsburgs’ mood. As the situation appears to
have been gradually deteriorating, the Rostov branch of the Ginsburg family is ready for
the first time to weigh the possibility of evacuation as a practical solution, but only if it
means not traveling too far. Emotional phrases such as “it won’t help anything” depicted
a growing panic among the Rostov Ginsburgs and pointed to an increasing discrepancy
between their sentiments and the official propaganda line. 
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43 The next letter was sent from Rostov on October 6, 1941: 
We are not considering any trip now because it is entirely impossible. We shall wait.
For the time being, there is no mass evacuation and hopefully there probably won’t
be one. Hitler won’t get us. It is hard to travel because of the children; our health is
not good; there are no men, the only one is Volodia, and he cannot do it. So we have
to stay here and hope that everything will  be all  right.  That’s  all  for now; it  is
difficult to say what lies ahead.53
44 The letter reveals the Ginsburgs’ continuous reluctance to move, which comes of course
as no surprise.  They have plenty of good reasons not to go anywhere.  What is more
surprising is their apparent passivity and probably even some signs of resignation to
their fate : “We shall wait…” This mood apparently runs counter to the ever‑optimistic
spirit voiced by the Soviet propaganda. The family certainly wants to believe in what was
written in the newspapers about the firm Soviet resistance. Yet when juxtaposing this
with the facts on the ground, they began to have serious doubts about whether the Red
Army was capable of checking the German advance.
45 The German armies approached closer to Rostov itself, and by now the Soviet press could
not keep silent any longer. On October 12, 1941, Molot published a passionate appeal to
the city’s population on its first page “To Turn Rostov into a Defense Fortress! To Rise as
One Man to Defend Our City!” The article mentioned “hordes of German Fascists” and
measures to be taken to cope with the danger. The appeal was signed by the Commander
of the North Caucasian Military District, Fedor Remezov, and the Secretary of the Rostov
municipal committee of the VKP(b), Boris Dvinski.54
46 An influx of organized evacuees and refugees fled from the advancing German armies and
found  themselves  in  the  North  Caucasus,  causing  panic  among  local  authorities.  On
October 14, 1941, Molot wrote: “The Fascists dispatch their agents, whose task is to spread
panic in the midst of the population by circulating various provocative rumors.”55 How
can we interpret this report, and how is it related to our narrative? There were many
evacuees and refugees, among them very many Jews in the city. The odds are high that
the information they possessed could be shared with local Jews and thus, prompt them to
leave. At the same time, the ever‑suspicious Soviet authorities tried to do their best to
prevent the flow of this information and, in all likelihood, succeeded in doing so to some
extent.
47 The rapidly deteriorating situation made itself felt in the next letter composed by sisters
Anna and Liza,  sent  from Rostov on October 26,  1941.  The letter  described dramatic
family events: 
I inform you that Anna and I stayed in Rostov. Our beloved Mania, Tamara, Tsilia,
and  the  small  children  were  evacuated  on  October 13  to  Budionnovsk
(Ordzhonikidze  territory).  Volodia  was  unable  to  get  evacuation permits  for  us.
That’s why we remained. We were very anxious before we got a message from them
saying they were all alive and in good health and arrived there all right. But Tamara
describes their terrible living conditions; it is better to die at home. We don’t know
any longer what to do, either to go to them and to suffer with them or to anticipate
the end of our lives here[…]
We wish strongly that we were together with you in Alma Ata, because it is there
where one feels quiet and safe. But apparently it is absolutely impossible! Now we
are all already dispersed and hardly know if we’ll see each other again! If we’ll see
each other at all!!! How difficult it is to endure and to suffer all this. But of course,
one should not lose one’s temper; let’s hope that we all shall be alive and see one
another again, God willing.56
To Flee or Not To Flee
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
8
48 The family’s response reflected the contradictory messages emanating from Soviet media
and the Ginsburgs’ distrust of them. As we have seen, the propaganda encouraged people
to stay by claiming that the situation was under control and the authorities would defend
Rostov at any cost. At the same time, panic brought by refugees and incessant German air
‑strikes, which passed unnoticed by the propaganda, indicated that the Germans were
near.  By the same token,  the media claimed Jews were targeted by the Germans for
mistreatment,  but  it  was  not  clear  to  what  extent.  On the whole,  protracted under‑
reporting or even non‑reporting in the media acted to considerably undermine their
credibility. 
49 As a result, the family split. The older generation decided not to decide. Of course, the
older ones appeared to have a solid reason not to move away: they did not get evacuation
permits. But as we know from many other sources, at this time it was possible to escape
on one’s own, without a permit. At least, one could try. Instead, they preferred to stay and
to wait; actually, they seem to have chosen to succumb to the inevitable. They did not
know exactly what would happen, but the letter was full of macabre foreboding: “the
most horrible things are yet to come;” “it is hardly possible that we will see each other
again;” and others. At the same time, the older Ginsburgs tried not to fall into despair by
indicating that their evacuated relatives might have made a mistake when they moved
away: “[I]t is better to die at home.” But they were now in a panic: dreaming about joining
their brother in Alma Ata, asking him for good advice, but not knowing what to do.
50 Sisters Anna and Liza, who stayed in Rostov, continued to keep their brother abreast of
the situation. On October 30, 1941, they wrote:
Now, after their letter, our dear, we (Anna and me) don’t know what to do, whether
we must stay here or go to them. There is no rescue there, either, and then, where
else  can  we go?  In  particular,  given  our  financial  resources.  So  we  don’t  know
ourselves what to do and whether we should make up our minds to perish. Maybe,
you, our dear one, will give us advice on what to do and how to behave, if we have
enough time to get your letter? […]
That’s all for the time being. We are all dispersed, and God knows when we shall see
each other, if at all. It is bitter and hard—what have we come to? And what shall we
come to? It is dreadful even to think about it. Take care and be happy. I hope you
will get this letter at least.57
51 The Rostov branch of the family was not sure whether their decision to stay was right.
Still,  the contents of this letter suggest that those family members who evacuated to
Budionnovsk had not evacuated sufficiently far away.  In other words,  Anna and Liza
Ginsburg  assumed  that  if  the  Germans  could  invade  Rostov,  they  could  also  invade
Budionnovsk. Let us also note that at this stage, nowhere in the correspondence is it
explicitly  mentioned  why  there  was  a  need  to  escape  from  the  Germans.  The
unarticulated danger seems to have been clear to everyone among the correspondents.
Overall, it appears that both prospects looked equally awful to the eyes of both branches
of the Ginsburg family. In other words, Anna and Liza, hitherto the main respondents in
this correspondence, appeared to internalize the idea that the Jews would be mistreated
under German rule, which reflected to no small extent the messages conveyed by Soviet
propaganda. Yet it was also a result of the family’s own thoughts. At the same time, the
sisters were deeply pessimistic about the prospects of the Soviets checking the German
advance in the Caucasus, and this pessimism ran counter to the official Soviet line.
52 On November 18, 1941, Liza and Anna sent their last letter before the German occupation
of Rostov: 
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I am writing to you to tell that we all are alive and in good health. […] We remained
here, now we do not know what to do, whether to go to them and to suffer with
them or to wait for death to come here? We are very anxious about you, our dear
one; and you are worried about us even more. We do not know anything about
[what is happening to one] another, and have received no messages whatsoever; it
is really painful. We want everything to go well‑and in peace, so that they will be
able to return to Rostov, to their home, to us. And not the other way about, that we
would have to go to them. They are suffering tremendously there and are deprived
of everything.58
53 The letter was written at a critical moment, only three days before Rostov was overtaken
by the German armies. However, the letter shows how little information on the actual
state of affairs around Rostov was available to the Ginsburg sisters. Three days prior to
the German occupation, they still contemplated the possibility of their fleeing to the east,
a route that was doubtless no longer feasible.
54 Still, it is evident that there was something particularly gloomy in the air, which left its
imprint on the contents of the letter. The sweeping fear of Germans that paralyzed Anna
and Liza was getting stronger and stronger. There appeared to be no chance to flee the
advancing Wehrmacht: sooner or later they would conquer everywhere and would catch
everyone. 
55 On the very same day, November 18, 1941, another letter was sent to Efim Ginsburg from
his relatives. This time, it was Tamara Meerovich from Budyonnovsk: 
We left Rostov by train on October 13. We did an unforgivably foolish thing. On
October 9, after Mariupol was seized, a terrible panic spread in Rostov, everyone
started to run. This mass flight had a strong impact on everyone’s state of mind—
you could not help but get caught up in it. Most important, the future does not bode
well but [only promises] horrors. We made several decisions in the course of one
day: a few times we [decided to] evacuate; at times we decided that it is better to die
on the spot than along the road, in a foreign land. But frequent bombardments and
the approach of the front line unsettled us completely.
With great difficulty, through the District Executive Council […] Volodia succeeded
in procuring evacuation permits for us, but only for five persons. Therefore, only I,
Tsylia, [my] mother and children left. […] How envious we are of them that they
remained  at  home  and  did not  experience  the  hardships  of  evacuation.  […]  Of
course, their life is not easy, either, but they are still at home in the warmth and,
most importantly, wherever we are, apparently the same thing awaits all of us. […] 
Volodia’s  letters  from  October 25  reassured  us;  he  wrote  that  the  enemy  was
repelled beyond Taganrog and that there is no need for us to fall into despair, that
as soon as the situation improves he will arrive and take us [away]. Yet his last
letter, dated November 12, upset us considerably since he wrote that the enemy was
again at the gates of Rostov, which was subjected to almost daily air raids. […] All
the time we write home, so, if need be, Aunt Anna and [Aunt] Liza could make their
way to us,  and then all  of  us  would leave,  in whatever direction.  But  generally
speaking, the situation is terrible. ….59
56 Tamara’s point of view was different from that of sisters Anna and Liza; she viewed the
situation as a refugee. The Ginsburg sisters had been born in the nineteenth century and
raised to  no small  extent  in Tsarist  Russia.  In contrast,  Tamara Meerovich was only
twenty‑eight in 1941 and thus, reared mainly during the Soviet period. It is to be expected
that the older Anna and Liza would be more broad‑minded in their  appraisals  while
Tamara would be more affected by her exclusively Soviet upbringing. We shall see soon
whether these assumptions materialize. 
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57 Now we have the opportunity to compare information supplied by Tamara with what the
Ginsburg sisters wrote. The result is obvious: assuming that the entire family was exposed
to the same propaganda messages while they were in Rostov, Anna and Liza refrained
from putting all of it on paper. We see, for example, that they did not write anything
about how the German seizure of the city of Mariupol affected the mood of Rostov’s
population, most specifically within their own family. Why were the sisters so cautious?
The explanation seems to involve several factors: first, fear of Soviet censors with all they
entailed; second, the sisters’ desire not to upset their brother. To compensate, Anna and
Liza augmented the lack of factual information with emotions. 
58 The letter also shows the extent of the chaos that reigned in the North Caucasus at that
time with respect to evacuation. Not only were the refugees not brought far enough from
the frontlines, and not only did they have to provide for themselves along the road and in
their temporary residences; they often attempted to get closer to rescue routes, violating
government regulations. This last point is particularly meaningful since their willingness
to violate Soviet rules indicates that these partly evacuated Jews regarded the Nazi threat
as more dangerous than non‑compliance with Soviet orders.
59 Overall, Tamara viewed her evacuation, at least at this stage, as “an unforgivably foolish
thing,” that is as a mistake. The inventory of considerations in favor of evacuation and
against it included German air‑strikes, comfortable living conditions, heating, and food
provision,  i.  e.  all  those  aspects  that  Tamara  could  become aware  of  from her  own
experience.  The dimensions  of  the  German  threat  to  her  family  as  Jews,  i.  e.  the
information  that  could  be  to  no  small  extent  obtained  via  Soviet  media,  obviously
remained unclear to Tamara, as this factor was absent from her balance sheet. 
60 Tamara’s  assessment  of  the  military  situation  differs  drastically  from the  optimistic
assurances  of  Soviet  media  and  is  summarized  in  the  phrase  “wherever  we  are,
apparently the same thing awaits all of us.” Furthermore, it is possible that she points
here not only to a possible German seizure of the North Caucasus but to the overall
outcome  of  the  Soviet‑German  war.  Tamara’s  pessimism  may  be  explained  by  her
intensive exposure to news about Nazi Germany’s advance and its treatment of Jews. This
information might come from refugees with whom she fled from Rostov to seek safety in
Budionnovsk. 
 
The third period (November 30 – December 31, 1941)
61 On November 30, slightly more than one day after the liberation of the city, Rostov’s
Municipal  Committee  of  Defense,  called  upon  local  civilians  to  return  to  work  on
December 260 and “to keep revolutionary order, to help the Red Army and authorities to
catch and destroy fascist agents.”61 This announcement was the first indication to the
local people of the restoration of stability to the city and was also the first official signal
that there had been collaborators in Rostov.
62 Approximately on November 30, the command of the Red Army published an account “On
the German Atrocities in Rostov”.62 The report provided relatively full details about the
German mistreatment of the local population. One case of mass murder of civilians was
highlighted but here, as well as in other cases, nothing was said about the Jews being
singled out for persecution. 
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63 The Red Army regained control in the city but fell short of pushing the frontline more
than fifty km from Rostov. Consequently, the Soviet authorities faced the problem of how
to  contain  the  population  within  the  beleaguered  city.  Their  approach  combined
limitations  on  leaving  Rostov  (issued  in  all  probability,  in  early  December)63 and
propaganda aimed at portraying the city as a safe and stable locale, with an emphasis on
the frontline being pushed far away from the immediate vicinity of the city64
64 In its ongoing efforts to bolster the fighting spirit of its citizens, Soviet propaganda made
a special effort to draw the attention of the local public to the suffering of both civilians
and captured Red Army soldiers under German rule in occupied Rostov. On December 4,
1941,  Molot  published  an  important  letter  by  inhabitants  of  Rostov  “We Will  Never
Forget” sent  to the “soldiers,  commanders,  and political  workers of  Ninth and Fifty‑
Eighth Armies” (active in the Southern sector):
[…] when you began to beat and destroy fascist hangmen, when fighting began on
the  streets  of  the  city,  we,  without  fear  of  death,  went  out  and  began  to  take
revenge  for  those  tortured  and  executed,  for  the  blood  of  our  children.  Some
women poured boiling water on the heads of the fascists; others killed them from
behind  a  corner  with  axes,  stones,  rifles.  Rostov’s  pioneers  were  also  actively
involved  in  exterminating  the  fascist  beasts.  They  threw Molotov  cocktails  and
stones at them. […] Piled on the streets, in houses and cellars are crippled corpses
of captured Red Army soldiers, professors, women and children. In Nakhichevan
there are the corpses of fifty‑two old men, women, and children shot down because
a German soldier was killed by someone in the house where they lived. […] On Kirov
Street near the Sel’mash plant,  there are the corpses of ten executed Red Army
soldiers. […] Both you and we have one thought, one irresistible desire: to destroy
all German occupiers. Oh, we can safely say: the revenge will be terrible.65
65 The rationale behind such messages was clear.66 Stirring up feelings of vengefulness in
both civilians and soldiers was a way to boost their morale. It is noteworthy that in line
with their  traditional  Soviet  policy,  these  messages  did  not  stress  that  the  Germans
singled out the Jews for maltreatment. 
66 On  December 7,  Molot  published  an  editorial  article  “To  Quickly  Liquidate  the
Consequences of German Rule in Rostov”: 
Our troops have seized Matveev‑Kurgan [situated on the Eastern coast of the Mius
River,  94  km to  the west  of  Rostov– KF].  A  fierce  battle  is  being waged on the
outskirts of Taganrog. It won’t take long before the hordes of German fascists will
be entirely ejected outside of the bounds of our district. 
67 This article provided readers with the name of a specific locality captured by the Soviet
troops so that they could figure out how far away the Wehrmacht had been repelled from
Rostov. But the article also claimed that the Red Army was at the outskirts of Taganrog,
the second most important city in the Rostov district. This news definitely sounded very
optimistic and was bound to boost the morale of Rostov’s populace. 
68 On December 9, Molot informed its readers that in the last day of the German occupation,
three hundred Jews had been shot in one of the city’s neighborhoods, Nakhichevan.67
Coupled  with  other  news  on persecutions  against  the  city’s  Jews,68 this  information,
available only to Anna and Liza Ginsburg, was bound to have a strong impact on them,
urging them to get out of Rostov as soon as possible.
69 On December 10, 1941, the Ginsburg sisters wrote their first letter after the liberation of
Rostov: 
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We are still alive and in good health, but as for the future, it is difficult to say what
awaits us. We endured a lot: God grant you never know [the details]. But if it recurs,
then it will be all over with us. But we want to believe that maybe it will not be
repeated, and these barbarians will not have any chance here. 
For the time being, evacuation permits are not being issued, but as soon as they are
given, we shall abandon everything and go away, because one cannot sell anything
now (since the consignment shop does not accept goods). But we may go with what
we can take with us. When you wrote that it was better to die at home, you would
have done better to write that we should have moved away immediately. It would
have been better; we would have arrived, but now it looks like we won’t succeed in
leaving.69
70 The sisters carefully avoided putting on paper whatever had happened to them during
the German occupation. From what they did write, it seems that they definitely suffered a
great deal, but it is difficult to say whether they were specially targeted as Jews or were
merely  persecuted  as  ordinary  Rostov  civilians.  Still,  judging  by  some  of  the  more
ominous remarks (for example, “if it recurs, then it will be all over with us”), they or
other Jews close to them were mistreated as Jews. Clearly, they recognized that if the
Germans were to return, Liza and Anna would be killed.
71 The fear that the Germans instilled in the Ginsburg sisters sufficed to make them decide
to flee at  any cost.  Evidently,  at  this  moment they felt  that  their  hope,  albeit  never
explicitly  articulated,  to  survive  the  storm under  German rule,  had  been misplaced.
Economic arguments and other troublesome issues (no man to accompany them, poor
health, age, winter, etc.) remained, but were no longer a deciding factor. We will soon see
whether this fear had a lasting effect.
72 On  December 11,  Molot  published  the  editorial  article,  “To  Further  Enhance
Revolutionary  Vigilance,”  highlighting  one  of  the  critical  messages  that  the  local
leadership was eager to convey to Rostov inhabitants:
It would be erroneous to fall into a state of complacency. We are well aware of the
insidiousness and cunning of the German robbers. There is no doubt that they will
attempt to disrupt the resumption of normal life in the city and to damage our
cause. In the first days after the liberation of the city, the Military Command, the
District Committee of the VKP(b), and the District Executive Committee issued an
appeal to the inhabitants of Rostov: “Fascists may have left their people in the city
in order to carry out diversions and murders. Keep utmost vigilance! Watch out for
suspects and inform Soviet agencies (organy) about them. Even if only one fascist
remaining in the city for his vile purposes is disclosed.” This directive should be
implemented with all energy and resolve. Fascist spies may also penetrate villages
and stanitsy, which are very close to Rostov […] We should know what people come
[…]  in  the  villages,  stanitsy;  with  particular  care,  we  should  guard  enterprises,
railway roads, bridges, roads […] We should close all holes and gaps, through which
fascist saboteurs and spies could penetrate. Also, we should expose fascist hangers‑
on and henchmen who under German rule behaved like traitors to the Fatherland,
robbers and marauders […] Dogs should be meted out a dog’s death. No mercy for
the traitors to the Fatherland, people who went over to the enemy, who helped
fascists commit their vile deeds! […] Let us further enhance revolutionary vigilance.
70
73 Given the special circumstances in Rostov after its liberation, the publication of this and
similar articles was most likely necessary.71 Yet it clearly brought local people back to the
gloomy atmosphere of spy‑hunting that had reigned in the Soviet Union for many years,
an atmosphere of paranoia that reached its climax in the late 1930s. Apart from making a
depressing impression on the local people, such messages were no doubt bound to impede
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people like the Ginsburgs from even considering flight from this endangered region in an
informal way, that is without the proper paperwork. 
74 How  did  Tsilia  Pinchos  (Anna’s  daughter  who  had  escaped  together  with  Tamara
Meerovich’s family) see the situation in recently liberated Rostov? On December 12, she
wrote a letter to her uncle in Alma Ata: 
We are now very concerned, as we are waiting for a letter from our aunt to reassure
us that she is alive and in good health after those terrible days that the damned
Hitler was there. But we calmed down a little bit, after some people came here from
Rostov and said that our neighborhood was not damaged. […] we anticipate that the
confounded enemy will be smashed. It is because of him that we are experiencing
all this, and we are confident that soon the enemy will be destroyed and all of us
will return home and lie on our soft beds and most importantly, we’ll be together.72
75 Tsilia proved to be well aware that Jews had not faced genocide during the first German
occupation. This suggests, in turn, that she remained less affected by Soviet propaganda
reports on the German atrocities in Rostov. Furthermore, the only reason she gives for
why her aunts could have been killed during that week was if “our neighborhood was […]
damaged.”  This  elliptical  expression  conceals  the  unpalatable  fact  that  Rostov  was
bombarded during the German occupation, and since the Germans were in control of the
city, it was evident that those who bombarded Rostov were the Soviets.
76 Yet, we should not overestimate Tsilia’s ability to soberly judge the situation. Like her
aunts, Liza and Anna, she also viewed her situation too optimistically. Encouraged by
Soviet reports that also influenced other Jewish evacuees who made their way back to
Rostov (“the situation at  the front improves every day”),73 Tamara assumed that the
Germans would soon be vanquished.
77 On December 12, Tamara sent a new letter from Budionnovsk: 
Despite all difficulties, we believe firmly in our imminent victory over these beasts
and scoundrels who commit unheard‑of atrocities against people.74 
78 The expression “unheard‑of atrocities against people” employed by Tamara was coined
by the Soviet propaganda. Its usage in the letter indicates that by that time, Tamara,
similar  to  her  aunts,  either  began  to  internalize  Soviet  propaganda  phraseology  or
became too cautious fearing that her letter might be intercepted by Soviet censors. On
the same day, Liza wrote from Rostov:
I have already written to you that our people left, but Anna and I stayed; it was
impossible to join them at that moment. Later, we decided that probably we would
not [have to] leave at all. But now, as soon as the evacuation permits are issued, we
will move away immediately, since we endured many horrors.75 
79 The sisters still refused to disclose exactly what happened to them during the last week of
November 1941,  and we can only try to guess what transpired.  It  is  likely that  they
witnessed or at least, quickly learned about the Germans’ murder of Rostov’s civilians at
Engels Street, close to their home, carried out in retaliation for the killing of a German
officer. This made a very strong impression on them, and it is no wonder that regardless
of reassuring messages conveyed by the Rostov newspaper,  the sisters were adamant
about the need to escape at the first opportunity.
80 On December  13,  Liza  and  Anna  wrote  another  letter  from Rostov.  It  began  with  a
description of the truly difficult economic conditions that the evacuated branch of the
family faced in Budionnovsk:
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Now they are deprived of the room and the fuel; their conditions deteriorated. They
are thinking about leaving (I don’t know where to), despite the fact that they are
not permitted to leave. I don’t know what will happen and in what way. 
Now we also made up our minds to move away as soon as evacuation permits are
given. Then, it might be possible for us go […] to Essentuki. God grant we would not
need to leave, but rather our family would return to us soon […] 
It is all about suffering, especially in winter. I’d like these German barbarians to be
pushed away as far as possible and forever; bandits, robbers, murderers, let them be
destroyed as soon as possible!76
81 The sisters stressed the apparently insurmountable difficulties confronting the refugees.
Although Liza and Anna suggested that these problems might cause the evacuees to leave
in future, at this stage, a return to Rostov still remained out of the question. Liza’s and
Anna’s resolve to flee was weakened. Old motives, such as hardships suffered along the
road,  which  had  been  critical  in  their  decision  not  to  evacuate  before the  German
occupation of Rostov, made their way back to their argumentation. Their vacillation is
manifest in the proposed destination of their evacuation, if the permits are given. If it
were up to the sisters,  at  this  point  they would flee not as  far  as  possible from the
Germans,  but  only  as  far  as  Essentuki,  a  small  resort  city  in  the Stavropol  territory
situated 523 km to the east of Rostov. Also, as previously, Liza and Anna voiced their
enthusiastic optimism, too reminiscent of official Soviet propaganda, for a Soviet victory.
But the sisters’ tone was somewhat more realistic: they wished the Germans above all be
pushed away from Rostov.  This victory,  given their change of mood favoring a more
limited escape, reflected the messages of Soviet propaganda. The possibility of absolute
victory was a far more remote event, not within reach. 
82 As the Red Army was not yet within reach of victory in the region, Rostov’s inhabitants
were warned to prepare for a long period of uncertainty. The article “Germans Put Up
Stubborn Resistance in the South,” published in Molot on December 18, claimed that “in
spite of enormous losses, Fascist troops offer stiff resistance.”77 On the same day, Anna
and Liza wrote to Efim: 
Thank God, we also all are alive and in good health. So far we are in Rostov, and God
grant that there will be no need to go anywhere, as we have not gone anywhere up
to now […] Now our only wish is to see our dear [relatives] coming back soon, so
that we will be all together, so that we should not need to go to them, because they
lead a difficult life. We have endured a lot […] 
We  do  not  need  money;  don’t  worry,  everything  will  be  fine;  the  enemy  will
certainly be smashed.78
83 Only five days had passed since the sisters’ previous letter, but the change in their mood
is obvious. The letter begins with the sisters’ statement that “we are glad and happy to
learn that you… are alive” as if it were Efim Ginsburg whose life was in danger. This was
followed by a number of other passages, suffused with unusual references to God, which
demonstrate to what extent Anna and Liza were out of touch with reality. Evidently as a
result of their continuous exposure to Soviet propaganda claiming that the recapture of
Rostov by the Red Army was only the beginning of a Soviet drive westwards, the sisters
eventually changed their minds. In the case of Anna and Liza, these messages fell  on
eager ears. 
84 The article published in Molot on December 19, “On Rostov’s Streets,” gives us a glimpse
into the way the city functioned in those days. The article described the construction of
defensive establishments in the city itself. At the same time, the article also showed how
peaceful  life  resumed:  water  pipes  and the  municipal  library  began to  work again.79
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Certainly, there was a degree of propaganda exaggeration in this description; yet this
testimony may help us better understand the behavior of the Ginsburg sisters eager to
stay in this city caught between war and peace because the situation appeared to be
firmly under control now.
85 On December 20, Liza and Anna wrote another letter to Efim:
We would be enormously happy and glad if we did not need to do it, if our relatives
returned soon to Rostov to their places and beds because they are really suffering
from all this. Nonetheless, we are not thinking about leaving, even for a while, since
I want to believe that the confounded barbarians will never be able to return here.
For the time being, there is no mass evacuation. I wish there would be none! So, we
are waiting. Of course, we would like to see everyone together. But how can we
arrange  all  this?  I  wish  only  that  the  damned  enemy  be  destroyed  as  soon  as
possible, and then it will surely be over. No doubt it will happen.80
86 This letter gives the impression that only two days after stating that they would not move
away, the sisters again hesitated about whether to leave or not. This time, they envisaged
a “local evacuation” not far away from Rostov, apparently to wait until the Red Army
firmly secured the area around the city.
87 An important article published on the second page of Molot, “Under Hitler’s Foot,” sheds
light on the fate of the Jewish population in the city of Taganrog, situated only 67 km to
the west of Rostov and occupied by the Wehrmacht since mid‑October 1941. This report
was  presented in  a  form of  personal  account,  written under  the  pseudonym Nikolai
Kostantinovich P., most likely a Soviet agent, who spent two months, from October 17 to
December 17, in the occupied city.
Soon after the takeover, the Hitlerites issued an order. All the Jews were required to
bear yellow armbands with six‑pointed stars, to go to School No. 27 and to take
warm clothes and [enough] food for three days. Afterwards, people who did not
suspect  anything  were  marched  to  trenches  near  the  instruments  plant,  their
executors fell  upon them, took their clothes away and killed them all,  including
elderly people and infants, by shooting them with machine‑guns.81
88 Unusual in the Soviet press, this was an unequivocal acknowledgement82 that the Jews
were being totally annihilated in the German‑controlled Soviet territories. The fact that
reference was made to events in a city in the Rostov district, situated very close to Rostov,
was bound to profoundly impress newspaper readers, provided they believed what was
published. 
89 One day later, on December 21, the sisters sent a new letter to Alma Ata. 
All the time we think that as soon as the evacuation permits are given we will put
everything aside and go to you or to Beba, although Beba is very unreliable in her
behavior. She came here to take us and went without us. She lost the invitation for
us.83
90 From this letter we learn that it was only due to a technical problem (their acquaintance
forgetting the necessary invitation) that Anna and Liza did not evacuate. If the sisters’
description of events was accurate, this is the first evidence that they were really ready to
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evacuate. Furthermore, for the first time, Anna and Liza discussed not only about a local
escape but also a full‑fledged flight to Central Asia.
91 Molot continued calling upon the Rostov public to display vigilance and self‑sacrifice in
defensive works. On December 23, the newspaper’s first page featured a “Resolution of
the plenary meeting of the [Rostov] District Committee of the VKP(b)”:
• To accelerate as much as possible the pace of defensive works because [the city of] Rostov
and the Rostov District are located in a battlefield zone […];
• To increase the pace of exposing revealing enemy henchmen, who proved to be anti‑Soviet
elements [pokazavshikh svoe antisovetskoe litso] during the German occupation.84
92 Such warning messages were bound to instill fear in the Ginsburgs and to lead them to
flee the city once the opportunity to do so presented itself.
93 On December 29, Molot published more notes emphasizing Rostov’s return to normalcy: it
reported about the resumption of studies in the city’s schools from January 1, 194285 and
the staging of the first performance at the Rostov Puppet Theater on December 31. This
theater, whose actors were recruited from other theaters, would stage, it was promised,
in January 1942 a new performance, “Rostov speaking” (Govorit Rostov) on the struggle
with the German Fascist occupiers.86
94 On December 29, 1941, Tamara wrote to Efim Ginsburg on behalf of the entire evacuated
part of the family: 
As of December 24, we are inhabitants of Ordzhonikidze. […] But as we hope not to
stay here too long and to return home soon, we want to live in a normal apartment;
after  all,  we  suffered  enough  in  Budionnovsk.  […]  When  the  Aisenshtarks  left
Rostov on December 13, Aunt Anna came to see them: they [the aunts] are in good
health and seem to have decided not to go anywhere, as they hoped that everything
would be all right. However, we wrote to urge them to leave, and then they must go
to Beba in Essentuki, where they may find accommodation and employment.87
95 Overall, with her mood being stirred up by Soviet victories well‑publicized by the Soviet
propaganda  machine,  Tamara  thought  that  her  troubles  were  almost  over  and
contemplated an eventual return to Rostov in the not too distant future.
96 On December 31, Anna and Liza sent a New Year’s greeting from Rostov:
Dear Efim! 
We congratulate you on the New Year. We are in good health. 
Hugs and kisses, Anna and Liza.88
97 Written only one month after their survival of the German occupation of Rostov, the
letter  attempts  to  convey  the  message  that  a  return  to  a  normal  life,  when people
celebrate each other on various occasions, is within reach.
 
Conclusion
98 After the outbreak of  the Soviet‑German war,  Soviet  media institutions continued to
fulfill their major prewar role as a propaganda tool. The portrayal of German anti‑Jewish
policies  fell  largely  within  this  function  if  only  because  such  reports  could  not  be
authenticated as long as the enemy remained in control of Soviet territories. In hindsight,
we know that even the most horrific accounts of German actions against Jews proved
largely accurate. But they had not yet been verified in 1941 and, therefore, were likely
regarded by many Soviet people, including Jews and in particular the Ginsburg family,
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accustomed to seeing how detached from reality Soviet media had been before the war, as
merely one more Soviet propaganda spin. Nevertheless, Soviet media can be credited in
no small measure with disseminating awareness of true German intentions towards Jews
that ultimately reverberated with the Ginsburgs and moved some of them to evacuate
while others considered leaving. 
99 Upon  the  onset  of  hostilities,  Soviet  media  institutions  also  faced  new  challenges,
including  the  need  to  inform  Soviet  citizens  in  a  timely  fashion  of  significant
developments on the battlefront. With regard to the Ginsburgs, this meant reporting the
actual state of affairs in the southern sector of the Soviet‑German front and providing
necessary information to arrange for flight from Rostov while it was still possible. Here
the results were largely disappointing:  the information was frequently unavailable or
distorted. Even when provided, it was outdated, resulting in a critical delay for those
eager to escape. In this sense, Soviet media bears their share of responsibility. 
100 In a final account, the impact of the messages emanating from Soviet media depended on
whether they accorded with the mindset of  their  consumers such the Ginsburgs and
whether  these  consumers  were  able  and willing  to  verify  media  content  from other
sources, mainly from rumors coming from refugees. In cognizance of the family’s fear of
Soviet censors and their desire not to upset each other overall, the penetration of Soviet
media notions is noticeable for all the respondents in 1941. However, occasionally some
of them were able to develop a more independent attitude towards events. This occurred
because of  their  exposure to alternative sources  of  news or  when the Soviet  regime
appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Then, the Soviet media, viewed as an inseparable
part of the regime, lost their last vestiges of credibility.
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ABSTRACTS
After  the  outbreak  of  the  Soviet‑German war,  Soviet  media  institutions  fulfilled  their  major
prewar role as a propaganda tool. The portrayal of German anti‑Jewish policies fell largely within
their functions if only because such reports could not be authenticated as long as the enemy
remained in control of Soviet territories. Therefore, they were likely regarded by many Soviet
people  as  merely  one  more  Soviet  propaganda  spin.  Among  them  was  a  Jewish  family,  the
Ginsburgs, from the South Russian city of Rostov‑on‑Don. Soviet media can be credited in no
small measure with disseminating awareness of the Germans’ real intentions towards the Jews
that ultimately reverberated to the Ginsburgs and incited some of them to evacuate while others
considered leaving. However, the critical information on the proximity of the German forces was
frequently  unavailable  or  distorted.  The  impact  of  the  messages  emanating  from the  Soviet
media depended on whether they accorded with the mindset of their consumers, such as the
Ginsburgs, and whether these consumers were able and willing to verify media content from
other sources, mainly rumors coming from refugees. In cognizance of the family’s fear of Soviet
censors and their desire not to upset each other overall,  one can say that the penetration of
Soviet media notions is noticeable in 1941.
Après  le  déclenchement  de  la  guerre  germano‑soviétique,  les  institutions  médiatiques
soviétiques remplirent leur rôle principal d’avant‑guerre d’outil de propagande. La description
des politiques anti‑juives allemandes entra pour une large part dans le champ de leurs fonctions,
ne  serait‑ce  que  parce  que  de  tels  rapports  ne  pouvaient  pas  être  authentifiés  tant  que  les
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territoires  soviétiques  resteraient  sous  domination  ennemie.  Par  conséquent,  il  est  probable
qu’ils  étaient  considérés  par  nombre  de  Soviétiques  simplement  comme  une  nouvelle
manipulation de la part de la propagande soviétique, parmi eux les Ginsburg, une famille juive,
originaire de Rostov‑sur‑le‑Don, ville du sud de la Russie. Les médias soviétiques peuvent être
crédités  dans  une  grande  mesure  d’avoir  informé  et  sensibilisé  le  public  sur  les  véritables
intentions des Allemands envers les  juifs,  ce qui  finit  par trouver écho auprès des Ginsburg,
incitant  les  uns  à  évacuer  pendant  que d’autres  songeaient à  partir.  Toutefois,  l’information
cruciale sur la proximité des forces allemandes était souvent indisponible ou déformée. L’impact
des messages émanant des médias soviétiques dépendait de leur adéquation avec la mentalité de
leur  public,  tels  les  Ginsburg,  et  de  la  possibilité  ou  du  souhait  de  ce  public  de  vérifier  les
contenus auprès d’autres sources,  principalement par le biais de la rumeur colportée par les
réfugiés. Prenant en considération la peur que la famille avait des censeurs soviétiques et le désir
de ses membres de ne pas s’inquiéter mutuellement, on peut dire que la pénétration des notions
des médias soviétiques est notable en 1941.
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